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Preference reversals have usually been explained by weighted additive models, in which 
different tasks give rise to different importance weights for the stimulus attributes, resulting 
in contradictory trade-offs. This article presents a preference r versal of a more extreme 
nature. Let (10, 5 Migr) denote living 10 years with a migraine for 5 days per week. Many 
participants preferred (10, 5 Migr) to (20, 5 Migr). However, when asked to equate these two 
options with a shorter period of good health, they usually demanded more healthy life years 
for (20, 5 Migr) than for (10, 5 Migr). This preference r versal within a single dimension 
cannot be explained by different importance weights and suggests irrationalities ata more 
fundamental level. Most participants did not change their responses after being confronted 
with their inconsistencies. 
One of the most frustrating findings in the classical view 
of preferences is the preference reversal phenomenon, orig- 
inally discovered by Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971) and Lind- 
man (1971) and subsequently confirmed (see Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1983, for a review). In an example of the basic 
phenomenon, ($x, yY) denotes adelayed payment in which 
one receives $x in y years from now. Many people, when 
asked to choose between the delayed payments ($1,600, 
1.5Y) and ($3,550, 10Y), prefer the first. However, when 
people are asked to state the instantaneous monetary value 
of these delayed payments, the majority assign a higher 
value to the second one (Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 
1990). Even when confronted with these seemingly contra- 
dictory actions, some people do not change their choices or 
evaluations but prefer to adhere to them and accept hese 
paradoxical ctions (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). 
Several explanations have been offered for these findings. 
At first, preference r versals were mostly explained as vi- 
olations of transitivity. Recent support for this explanation 
was given by Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (1989). A 
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violation of procedure invariance is currently the prevailing 
explanation (Tversky et al., 1990). For instance, when as- 
sessing the instantaneous monetary values of delayed pay- 
ments (matching), persons base their actions on a particular 
value system. When choosing between delayed payments, 
however, they base their actions on another value system. 
Therefore, preferences from choosing are different from 
those yielded by matching; this fact constitutes a violation 
of procedure invariance. The explanations invoking a vio- 
lation of procedure invariance are mostly based on weighted 
additive models. These models assume that, both for choos- 
ing and for matching, a participant evaluates delayed pay- 
ment ($x, yY) by using av(x) + bw(y), where v and w are 
values for the separate attributes and a > 0 and b > 0 sum 
to 1 and are importance weights. It is generally assumed that 
the value functions v and w are the same for choosing and 
matching and that only the weights a and b vary. That is, for 
choosing, particular weights, such as a c and be, are adopted, 
and for matching, other weights, such as a m and b m, are 
adopted. Note that because importance weights are positive, 
choosing and matching yield the same unidimensional or- 
derings over single attributes (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 
1988, p. 377). 
The scale compatibility hypothesis assumes that, in the 
matching task, the participant's attention is primarily di- 
rected toward the dimension for which a matching value is 
to be provided, that is, the monetary dimension in our 
example. The participant pays less attention to the other 
dimension (time), which therefore receives a lower impor- 
tance weight. The scale compatibility hypothesis predicts 
that, in our example, with a m being the importance weight 
for money in matching and with a c being the importance 
weight for money in choosing, am will be higher than a~. 
This prediction agrees with the observed choices. 
Another explanation is provided by the strategy compat- 
ibility hypothesis. Choosing is basically a qualitative activ- 
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ity; participants are more inclined to resort to qualitative 
methods for solving the decision problem. Hence, partici- 
pants tend to simply choose the delayed payment that ap- 
pears best for the prominent (most important) attribute, thus 
avoiding the necessity of comparing trade-offs for different 
attributes. For choosing, strategy compatibility leads to an 
overweighting of the prominent attribute; this overweight- 
ing is called the prominence ffect. Matching is a quantita- 
tive activity; participants weigh a favorable trade-off or one 
attribute against an unfavorable trade-off or another at- 
tribute, so their value system is more balanced. On the basis 
of the assumption that time is the prominent attribute for 
delayed payments, the prominence effect again predicts that 
a m will be higher than a c, in agreement with the observed 
choices. In experiments by Fischer and Hawkins (1993), the 
prominence effect was found to be stronger than the scale 
compatibility effect. 
Mellers, Ord6fiez, and Birnbaum (1992) considered alter- 
native xplanations ofpreference r versals. In the change of 
process theory, fixed attribute valuation functions (v, w) 
(scale convergence) are assumed, in keeping with the 
weighted additive models described above. However, this 
theory permits more general ways of aggregating attribute 
valuation functions into overall valuations for various con- 
texts. These investigators tested weighted average models 
(contingent weighting theory) for the general case in which 
the attribute valuation functions (v, w) can be any functions 
and rejected this theory in favor of the theory that the 
combination operation changes from multiplicative toaddi- 
tive depending on the response scale and stimulus 
distribution. 
When a new phenomenon that falsifies an existing theory 
is discovered, as few modifications a possible are made and 
a new, generalized theory that is as simple as possible is 
developed. Thus, although preference r versals falsify clas- 
sical preference theory, the explanations advanced so far 
have preserved most of preference theory. It is true that 
preferences are no longer considered invariable and that 
they are now considered to depend on the task (matching or 
choosing). However, within each task, preference theory is 
still accepted, and the only difference across tasks is in the 
variability of importance weights. 
We describe preference r versals of a more extreme na- 
ture than in the cases described above. In the latter, choos- 
ing and matching tasks must coincide for comparisons in
which only one attribute is involved. For instance, if a 
person prefers ($1,600, 1.5Y) to ($1,600, 5Y) in a choosing 
task, then the person should behave accordingly in a match- 
ing task. This prediction is a direct consequence of the 
higher scale value for 1.5Y than for 5Y (as also implied by 
scale convergence) and monotonicity for both contexts. 
This principle can be called unidimensionai procedure in- 
variance. The preference r versals presented in this article, 
however, violate unidimensional procedure invariance and 
thus scale convergence. 
This article is organized as follows. First, we present the 
preference structure underlying our study and describe the 
experiments and results. We discuss the preference r versals 
revealed by the data and their implications for the founda- 
tions of decision theory. The relationship of our preference 
reversals to an interesting violation of dominance, described 
by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and by Birnbaum, Coffey, 
Mellers, and Weiss (1992), is explained. We describe im- 
plications of our discovery for commonly used methods of 
outcome valuation in medical decision making and draw 
conclusions. 
The Preference Structure Underlying Violations of 
Unidimensional Procedure Invariance 
To obtain violations of unidimensional procedure invari- 
ance for choices between two-attribute alternatives, we used 
a domain in which the rational evaluation scheme is multi- 
plicative rather than additive. Our stimuli concerned chronic 
states of health; for example, (L, Q) denotes living L years 
in the (constant) chronic state of health Q, followed by 
immediate death. A natural evaluation is the multiplicative 
scheme 
V(L) × W(Q), (1) 
where W(Q) evaluates well being in state of health Q and 
V(L) describes the valuation of life duration. The function V
can deviate from linearity to express, for instance, time 
discounting (Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988). 
Multiplicative models with positive factors can be re- 
duced to additive models by a logarithmic transformation; 
therefore, they are equivalent to additive models in a pref- 
erential sense. In this study, however, states of health that 
are worse than death are considered and should be assigned 
negative values. In the presence of both positive and nega- 
tive values, multiplicative models cannot be reduced to 
additive models. 
It has been found that a rational valuation of chronic 
health states can be more complicated than the above- 
described multiplicative model. For a poor health state Q, 
there is usually a maximum endurable time S (depending on 
the participant), so that up to S the participant still values 
life positively (Sutherland, Llewelyn-Thomas, Boyd, & Till, 
1982). In Figure 1, health states Q1 and Q2 are positive and 
the utility curves fan out; however, the utility curve for a 
health state with a maximum endurable time has a single 
peak. Let the value of (S, Q) be U(S, Q) > 0. Only for the 
years after S does the value of life become negative. Thus, 
for T > S the total value of living T years in health state Q 
is 
U(S,Q) + [V(T-  S)] × W(Q), (2) 
where W(Q) is negative. If the value of W(Q) is not highly 
negative and T is not much longer than S, then the described 
value of (T, Q) will still be positive and the number of 
healthy ears equivalent to (T, Q) will be positive (shaded 
area in Figure 1). Only for the years after S can the valuation 
be determined by a negative mulfiplicative model. 1 Our 
1Let L = T -S and subtract the constant U(S, Q); subtracting a 
constant can always be done for a utility function without affecting 
the preference scheme. 
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Figure 1. Utility versus duration f r three different health states, 
Q1, Q2, and Q. For health state Q with a maximum endurable time 
S, the preference curve has a single peak. 
unidimensionai preference reversals are generated in the 
shaded area of Figure 1. 
For this study, we selected participants for whom health 
durations were longer than S. For most of them, the value of 
stimuli (T, Q) still seemed to be positive; only a few 
participants did not have a positive number of healthy years 
equivalent to stimuli (T, Q). 
Exper iment la  
In this experiment, women were selected by the condition 
that they preferred living 25 years with metastasized breast 
cancer, (25, M), to living 50 years with metastasized breast 
cancer, (50, M). Therefore, these women preferred a shorter 
life to a longer life for the health state metastasized breast 
cancer .  
After being selected, women were asked how many years 
in good health they consider quivalent to the outcomes (25, 
M) and (50, M). Such questions are typically asked in the 
so-called time trade-off (qTO) method, which is commonly 
used in medical decision making to assess values of health 
states (Torrance, Thomas, & Sackett, 1972). 
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight women who were 20 years old or 
older participated. All participants were students at the University 
of Nijmegen. 
Procedure. The interviews were done on an individual basis. 
In the selection session, which lasted for about 10 min, a partici- 
pant was told that she would be participating in a pilot study 
concerning decision making by women who have an increased risk 
for breast cancer attributable to family history. Written health state 
descriptions containing the physical, psychological, and social 
consequences for three health states, namely, living with metasta- 
sized breast cancer, living after prophylactic mastectomy, and 
living with genetic ounseling, were prepared. The participant read 
the health state description of living with metastasized breast 
cancer. She was selected for further participation if she preferred 
(25, M) to (50, M). In that case, the other two health state 
descriptions were given, and she was asked to read the health state 
descriptions carefully at home and imagine as vividly as possible 
how these health states would affect her personal life. 
All health states were described as static, that is, the pain and 
discomfort were described as being constant over the whole dura- 
tion. We also emphasized that death at the end of the 25- or 
50-year period was not caused by the cancer process but that a 
painless death occurred through an unexpected accident. Thus, we 
countered the assumption that the first 25 years of life with cancer 
would be a better 25 years for a person who went on to live another 
25 years than for a person who died after 25 years. 
The test session was done on a separate day. The participant was 
asked to indicate the number of life years she would be prepared 
to sacrifice to avoid living for a given period in an inferior health 
state. The result is the TI'O equivalent, (denoted by X), that is, the 
number of years in perfect health considered equivalent to Y years 
in inferior health. The number X was obtained by a bisection 
procedure involving forced choices between duration X in perfect 
health and fixed duration Y in inferior health (Sacker & Torrance, 
1978). The starting number X was chosen randomly within the 
range from 0 to Y years to counterbalance anchoring effects. After 
an initial preference was stated, the value of X was bisected by the 
interviewer until the participant expressed indifference. The par- 
ticipants were instructed that there were no fight or wrong answers 
and that their answers hould reflect their own preferences. We 
used practice trials to ensure that participants understood the task. 
The Tro  test was administered with four durations Y for the 
three health states, namely, 5,. 10, 25, and 50 years, amounting to 
12 TTO questions. The questions were administered on a computer 
screen in a different random order for each participant. At the end 
of the test, the participants were again asked to indicate whether 
they preferred (25, M) or (50, M). The most preferred duration 
with metastasis (so, in terms of Equation 2, the maximum endur- 
able time S) was determined by use of unidimensional choices 
among various durations of living with metastasis; e.g., "Do you 
prefer (5, M) or (10, M)?" 
Results and Discussion 
Thirty-four of 48 participants preferred the (25, M) out- 
come to the (50, M) outcome and were selected. The pref- 
erences of (25, M) over (50, M) were reliable in the sense 
that at the end of the experiment, all women but 1 confirmed 
the preference in the selection procedure for the shorter over 
the longer duration. Thus, 33 participants remained. We 
expected that these participants would assign a shorter "ITO 
equivalent to the (50, M) outcome than to the preferred (25, 
M) outcome. Contrary to this expectation, the majority of 
the selected participants, 23 of the remaining 33, p < .05, 
assigned a longer "I'TO equivalent to the (50, M) outcome. 
The (50, M) and (25, M) outcomes are unlikely because 
the 10-year survival rate for metastasized breast cancer is 
only 10%. In other words, our choice alternatives are hy- 
pothetical. For more realistic shorter life durations, similar 
preference reversals were observed; however, fewer partic- 
ipants passed the selection criterion. For instance, 11 par- 
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ticipants preferred (---5, M) to (10, M). Seven of 11 assigned 
equal TTO equivalents, close to or equal to 0, to all four 
durations with metastasis. Contrary to the predictions of 
rational choice theories, of the remaining 4 participants, 3 
assigned a longer TrO equivalent to the (10, M) outcome. 
Six participants preferred a duration of between 5 and 10 
years with metastasis to(25, M). Contrary to the predictions 
of rational choice theories, 5 of these 6 participants assigned 
a longer TTO equivalent to the (25, M) outcome. 
Seven participants were confronted with their preference 
reversals. Only 1 participant changed her responses, but not 
enough to alleviate the preference r versal. 
Experiment lb 
In this experiment, we increased the number of partici- 
pants to increase the power of our test. The experiment was 
conducted in a classroom setting with, on average, 17 stu- 
dents per class. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-seven high-school students with a mean 
age of 18 years participated. Ofthese, 39 served as participants and 
the others played the role of interviewers. 
Procedure. The students were divided into four groups in- 
structed on separate occasions. A brief introduction to the medical 
decision-making problem for women at high risk for breast cancer 
was given. Two health state descriptions, prophylactic mastectomy 
and metastasis, were read by the students. Next, the TTO test with 
four durations, resulting in 8 questions, was administered onpaper 
by the interviewers. The questions were presented to all partici- 
pants in the same random order. There was ample time to ensure 
that the instructions were understood. After the test, the partici- 
pants were asked to indicate whether they preferred (25, M) or 
(50, M). 
Results 
Of the 39 students, 17 preferred (25, M) to (50, M). The 
majority of these students (14 of 17, p < .01) assigned a
longer "1~O equivalent to the (50, M) outcome, aresult hat 
is contrary to the predictions of rational choice theories. 
We carded out an analysis of the "I'TO X/Y ratios found 
in Experiment 1. This analysis provided another illustration 
of the irrationality contained in the participants' answers. 
The analysis also provided evidence for the proportional 
heuristic that may explain the participants' behavior in 
Experiment 1 and that we discuss later. The TTO equiva- 
lents from Experiment la and this experiment were com- 
bined in this analysis. We calculated the X/Y ratios for 
participants who, contrary to the predictions of rational 
choice theories, assigned a longer I~O equivalent to the 
(50, M) outcome. X denotes the TI'O equivalent, and Y 
denotes the duration with metastasis. For instance, when a 
participant is indifferent for the choice between (5, Good 
Health) and (10, M), the X/Y ratio equals 5/10. The X/Y 
ratios are plotted in Figure 2. Note that, on average, the TTO 
equivalent X for (50, M) equals 27.2 healthy ears, whereas 
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Figure 2. Time trade-off ('Fro) X/Y ratios for participants who 
preferred (25, M) over (50, M). X = ~ equivalent; Y = 
duration with metastasis; M = metastasis; PM = prophylactic 
mastectomy; GC = genetic ounseling. 
the TTO equivalent X for (25, M) equals 13.9 healthy ears, 
even though our selected participants preferred (25, M) over 
(50, M). 
All three curves howed significantly lower X/Y ratios for 
the 5-year outcomes. Our young participants frequently 
commented that, for the short erm, they disliked a decrease 
in the quality of life; for instance, they indicated that, for the 
short term, they would rather do without he burden of an 
operation with a long recovery period. Apparently, the value 
of the three health states hould not be considered constant 
for the short term. Therefore, we used the 10-, 25-, and 
50-year durations to test for constant X/Y ratios. We used 
multivariate within-subject tests for linear and quadratic 
contrasts. For the metastasis health state, the linear and 
quadratic ontrasts were not significant, F(1, 36) = 0.18, 
p < .67, and F(1, 36) = 0.19, p < .67, respectively. For the 
prophylactic mastectomy health state, the linear contrast 
was significant, although the quadratic ontrast was not, 
F(1, 34) -- 6.95, p < .01, and F(1, 34) = 0.16, p < .70, 
respectively. For the genetic counseling health state, the 
linear and quadratic ontrasts were not significant, F(1, 
37) = 0.63, p < .44, and F(1, 37) -- 3.31, p < .08, 
respectively. 
Experiment 2
One might hypothesize that our participants tacitly as- 
sumed that living 25 or 50 years with metastasis i not 
realistic and that this assumption might have induced the 
preference reversal. Therefore, in this experiment, a more 
realistic health state was used. We chose living x days per 
week with migraine as that health state. 
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Method 
Participants. Twenty-eight high-school students with a mean 
age of 18 years participated. 
Procedure. This experiment was conducted in a classroom 
setting. The students read a 1-page health state description of 
living with migraine. Next, they were asked whether they preferred 
living 10 years with migraine x days per week to living 20 years 
with migraine x days per week. The number x was varied until 12 
students preferred the shorter period. This preference occurred at 4 
days per week with migraine. To slightly increase the number of 
students for whom the health state was negative, we subsequently 
used 4.5 days per week with migraine (4.5 Migr) in the "1~O test. 
A brief introduction tomedical decision making for women who 
have an increased risk for breast cancer attributable to family 
history was given. The use of the TTO test was explained. The 
students erved in turn as interviewers and as participants. The 
TTO test was administered on paper. Besides the migraine ques- 
tions, additional questions were used with the genetic ounseling 
and prophylactic mastectomy health states. Thus, the TTO test 
consisted of nine questions (three durations, 5, 10, and 20 years, 
and three health states, 4.5 days per week with migraine, prophy- 
lactic mastectomy, and genetic ounseling). The questions were 
presented to all participants in the same random order. After the 
test, the participants were asked to indicate on paper whether they 
preferred living 10 years with migraine 4.5 days per week (10, 4.5 
Migr) to (20, 4.5 Migr). 
Results 
Sixteen students preferred (10, 4.5 Migr) to (20, 4.5 
Migr). Contrary to the predictions of rational choice theo- 
ries, 15 of these 16 students, p < .001, assigned a longer 
TFO equivalent to the (20, 4.5 Migr) outcome than to the 
(10, 4.5 Migr) outcome. Only 1 student assigned a shorter 
TFO equivalent to the (20, 4.5 Migr) outcome. 
Next, we analyzed the TrO X/Y ratios for this experi- 
ment. The TrO X/Y ratios for these 15 participants are 
plotted in Figure 3. Again, for the short term, our partici- 
pants traded more healthy years. We used the 10- and 
20-year durations to test for constant X/Y ratios. For the 
migraine health state, there was no significant difference, 
F(1, 14) = 0.54, p < .48. Also, for the prophylactic mas- 
tectomy health state, there was no significant difference, 
F(1, 11) = 0.79, p < .39. For the genetic ounseling health 
state, the difference was significant, F(1, 12) = 5.66, 
p < .04. 
Exper iment  3 
In this experiment, participants were confronted with the 
preference reversals and asked whether they wanted to 
change their response patterns. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four high-school students with a mean age 
of 17 years participated. Fifty-five of the participants were young 
women. 
Procedure. This experiment was conducted in a classroom 
setting. The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2. 
1 
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Figure 3. Time trade-off ('ITO) X/Y ratios for participants who 
preferred (10, 4.5 Migr) over (20, 4.5 Migr). X = "I~O equivalent; 
Y = duration with metastasis; Migr = migraine; PM = prophy- 
lactic mastectomy; GC = genetic ounseling. 
For the migraine health state, we chose 5 days per week with 
migraine. 
The TTO test was administered on paper. Besides the migraine 
questions, additional questions were used with the genetic oun- 
seling and prophylactic mastectomy health states. The durations 
were the same as in Experiment 2.In contrast to the situation in our 
other experiments, the indifference point in the "FrO test was 
obtained through a direct match and not through choices. This 
strategy was used to save time for the confrontation with the 
inconsistency.. After the test, the participants were asked to indi- 
cate on paper whether they preferred (10, 5 Migr) to (20, 5 Migr). 
Next, the nature of the preference r versal was explained to the 
participants. The following scheme was depicted on a blackboard: 
(10,5 Migr) > (20,5 Migr) 
(4, Healthy) < (8, Healthy). 
It was explained that the equals igns designated the indifference 
obtained in the TTO task between, e.g., (4, Healthy) and (10, 5 
Migr). Next, it was explained that this response pattern entailed a
preference r versal. This scheme was also present on the response 
sheet in the following form: 
(10,5 M igr ) . . .  (20,5 Migr) 
( . . . .  Healthy) . . .  ( . . . .  Healthy). 
The participants were instructed to indicate their choice preference 
for the first line (choosing task). They had to copy their corre- 
sponding answers from the matching task to the appropriate spaces 
in the last line of the scheme on the response sheet. Then, they 
filled in the appropriate preference signs. The participants hen 
indicated whether their responses were inconsistent. In the case of 
inconsistency, they had to indicate on a 10-point scale whether 
they understood that their responses were inconsistent. In The 
Netherlands, the 10-point rating scale is the standard grading 
system, so our participants were familiar with this scale. 
Finally, participants with inconsistent answers had to indicate 
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whether they were willing to change their esponse patterns. Four 
choices were offered: (a) no changes, (b) indicate anew match for 
(10, 5 Migr), (c) indicate a new match for (20, 5 Migr), and (d) 
indicate anew choice preference b tween (10, 5 Migr) and (20, 5 
Migr). 
Resul~ 
Sixty-four forms were returned. Three incomplete or il- 
legible forms were discarded. Thus, 61 participants re- 
mained. Of these, 23 preferred (20, 5 Migr) to (10, 5 Migr) 
and 1 indicated that (10, 5 Migr) was equivalent to (20, 5 
Migr). 
For the remaining 37 participants, the shorter duration 
with migraine was preferred to the longer one, and a pref- 
erence reversal was observed for 27 participants, p < .01. 
Of the remaining 10 participants, 5 assigned a longer I3"O 
equivalent to the (10, 5 Migr) outcome and 5 assigned equal 
"I'TO equivalents (usually 0) to (10, 5 Migr) and (20, 5 
Migr). 
The 27 participants with the preference r versals all cor- 
rectly indicated that they were inconsistent. The average 
rating for how well they understood that their responses 
were inconsistent was 7.5, which in the standard grading 
system in The Netherlands indicates a "more than Suffi- 
cient" to "good" understanding. Of these 27 participants, 21 
indicated that they did not want to change their responses. 
One participant changed her TTO equivalent for (10, 5 
Migr) but remained inconsistent. Three participants 
changed their T ro  equivalents for (20, 5 Migr); 2 of these 
3 became consistent. Two participants changed both Tro  
equivalents and became consistent. Therefore, we con- 
cluded that after the confrontation, only 4 of 27 participants 
undid their original preference reversals. None of the 27 
participants changed their original preference for (10, 5 
Migr) over (20, 5 Migr). 
General Discussion 
For poor health states uch as metastasized breast cancer 
or continuous migraines, we found that people may prefer a 
shorter to a longer life duration. Nevertheless, when asked 
to state the equivalent umber of healthy ears, participants 
as a rule demanded more healthy life years for the longer 
life duration than for the shorter one. Therefore, the longest 
number of healthy ears was assigned to the nonpreferred 
outcome. The results of the three experiments taken together 
indicate that 79 of 103 participants assigned a longer life 
duration to the nonpreferred outcomes, p < .001. This 
finding is at odds with classical rationality principles and 
concurs with the other examples of preference r versals in 
the literature. 
Possible Objections to Our Findings 
Our results could be criticized because no real outcomes 
were used; therefore, participants might not have been 
highly motivated. Obviously, for the choice alternatives of
our study, chronic health states, no "actual payment" is 
possible. Still, because of the practical relevance of this 
research, which was pointed out to the participants, our 
participants were motivated. The experiments in the litera- 
ture have mostly considered hypothetical gambles for 
money. In general, no substantial difference was found 
between hypothetical gambles and gambles in which par- 
ticipants are actually paid according to their choices (Casey, 
1991; Grether & Plott, 1979; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973; 
Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ord6fiez, 1992; Pom- 
merehne, Schneider, & Zweifel, 1982; Slovic, 1975, Exper- 
iment 3; Tversky & Kalaneman, 1992); an exception is 
Bohm (1994). 
Another concern with our experiments could be a selec- 
tion bias. For example, suppose for a moment that the only 
"true" preference would be a preference for (20, 5 Migr) 
over (10, 5 Migr). Then, by selecting only participants who 
in a first preference expressed the opposite, we selected only 
incorrect prior preferences. A preference change by a ma- 
jority of participants in the TI'O test could be explained 
solely by a correction of preference on closer inspection by 
the participants. However, we carefully elicited the prior 
preference of (20, Migr) over (10, Migr). All participants 
but 1 reaffirmed their prior preference at the end of the 
experiment. Also, in Experiment lb, the choice between 
(25, M) and (50, M) was obtained after the matching task. 
Therefore, we conclude that the described selection bias 
does not underlie our findings. 
For the breast cancer experiment, one might object that, 
despite the static health state description, our participants 
perceived the metastasis health state as being less severe 
with the (50, M) stimulus than with the (25, M) stimulus. 
Some participants raised this objection and were told that 
the health state was really static. In any case, this objection 
does not explai n why these participants still preferred the 
shorter to the longer life duration in the choosing task. Also, 
this objection cannot be raised for the migraine health state, 
for which similar rates of preference reversals were 
observed. 
A factor that may have contributed partly to our findings 
is that the response scale only provides positive life dura- 
tions, whereas ome stimuli may actually have had a neg- 
ative value (worse than immediate death) for some partici- 
pants. In the preference model with a single-peak preference 
curve (Figure 1), the position of, for instance, (20, 4.5 Migr) 
would then be below the 0 level on the utility axis. Perhaps 
our experiment was misleading in this regard and so our 
findings are not relevant. However, we think that his aspect 
of a misleading positive response scale for negative stimuli 
may underlie some preference r versals, but not many. Only 
10% of the participants matched (10, 4.5 Migr) to (0, 
Healthy). Most participants who exhibited preference r ver- 
sals matched the migraine or metastasis health states to 
positive healthy life years considerably remote from 0; the 
average X/Y ratios were 0.4 and 0.55 for the migraine and 
metastasis health states, respectively. These results leave 
ample space on the response scale for matching (20, 4.5 
Migr) or (50, M) to shorter numbers of healthy life years 
(shaded area in Figure 1). However, even after being con- 
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fronted with the inconsistency, most participants did not 
change their responses 
Finally, it is possible that preference r versals are sensi- 
tive to context effects: Different sets of stimuli may induce 
different evaluation strategies (Birnbaum et al., 1992; 
Mellers, Ord6fiez, & Bimbaum, 1992). We think that it is 
less likely that our violation is sensitive to context effects. 
Experiment 3 shows that the violation is robust against 
direct confrontation of the participants with the inconsis- 
tency; in a way, confrontation provides the most critical 
context for the phenomenon. 
Implications of Our Findings 
Our preference reversals were more extreme than tradi- 
tional preference reversals. The (20, 5 Migr) and (10, 5 
Migr) outcomes differed only in one attribute. Therefore, 
unidimensional procedure invariance was violated. In the 
choosing task, (10, 5 Migr) was preferred to (20, 5 Migr), 
but in the matching task, the participant assigned a higher 
value to (20, 5 Migr) than to (10, 5 Migr). Traditional 
preference reversals (Beattie & Baron, 1991; Bimbaum et 
al., 1992; Bostic, Herrnstein, & Luce, 1990; Casey, 1991; 
Cho, Luce, & yon Winterfeldt, 1994; Delquit, 1993; Fischer 
& Hawkins, 1993; Fischhoff et al., 1980; Goldstein & 
Einhorn, 1987; Gonz,~iles-Vallejo & Wallsten, 1992; Grether 
& Plott, 1979; Hawkins, 1994; Hershey & Schoemaker, 
1985; Johnson & Schkade, 1989; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
1971; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973; Lindman, 1971; Loomes 
et al., 1989; Mellers, Chang, et al., 1992; Mellers, Ord6fiez, 
& Birnbaum, 1992; Pommerehne etal., 1982; Slovic, 1975; 
Slovic et al., 1990; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky et 
al., 1988; Tversky et al., 1990) occur when stimuli are 
compared for more than one attribute, and they have been 
explained mostly by changes in the weighting with which 
the attributes are combined in different tasks. This explana- 
tion cannot be applied to our findings. (Note that importance 
weights must be positive so that sign reversals are 
excluded.) 
The most central question for preference r versals is the 
following: If choosing and matching reveal different pref- 
erences, then which method provides "better" preferences? 
Here, "better" means more accurately reflective of the par- 
ticipant's values or more rational in a normative sense. 
Tversky et al. (1988, p. 383) asked respondents who exhib- 
ited preference reversals to reconsider their actions and 
found that modifications occurred in either direction. They 
conjectured that choosing and matching are both biased in 
opposite directions but suggested that their finding "may 
reflect a routine compromise rather than the result of a 
critical reassessment" on the part of the participants. In a 
study of choice compared with direct judgment of well 
being, Tversky and Griffin (1991) suggested that choice is 
"insufficiently sensitive to contrast" (p. 117) (contrast: com- 
pare your income to the average in your country), whereas 
judgment is insufficiently sensitive to endowment (endow- 
ment: absolute level of income) (see also Fischhoff, Slovic, 
& Lichtenstein, 1980; Johnson & Schkade, 1989, p. 423; 
and Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990, p. 25). In short, the 
present state of the art does not suggest whether choosing or 
matching is better for assessing preferences. 
Our findings suggest hat choosing provides the better 
information, at least in the domain of our study. Participants 
in our experiments were finn with regard to their initial 
preferences for the shorter duration over the longer duration 
for the metastasis and migraine health states (i.e., the selec- 
tion criterion for the experiment), but when asked to explain 
the longer numbers of healthy life year equivalents, their 
reactions were different. Some replied, "One should take 
proportions here, shouldn't one?" Also, in Experiment 3, 
none of the participants changed their choice preferences 
after being confronted with the preference reversals, but 
several participants changed the number of healthy life year 
equivalents. 
Our interpretation is as follows. In a matching task, a 
participant should provide a number as a response and 
usually should base this number on data that are also in the 
form of numbers. Apparently, this format induces partici- 
pants to f'md simple mathematical heuristics for generating 
answers and to relate their actions insufficiently to their 
feelings and preferences. Even if the bisection procedure 2 is 
used, participants resort o mathematical heuristics, possibly 
recognizing the underlying matching task. In this study, 
when trading off life years, participants used a method that 
seems sensible in the majority of cases (positive health 
states) and did not realize that they were dealing with the 
exceptional case in which additional life years are not 
advantageous. This situation could be Lrlterpreted as an 
extreme case of scale compatibility, in which participants 
concentrate on the life duration dimension to the degree of 
forgetting that, because of the poor health state, additional 
life years should now be evaluated negatively. This inter- 
pretation suggests that, from a normative point of view, the 
heuristics adopted by participants in matching tasks are 
more ad hoc and irrational than has been commonly 
thought. This suggestion is a further argument in favor of 
the choosing task. In the section Implications for Medical 
Decision Making, we discuss in further detail a heuristic that 
the majority of participants seemed to adopt in our study, 
that is, the proportional heuristic. 
Relationship With Birnbaum et al. 's (1992) 
Preference Reversal 
Our preference reversal can be related to previous ones 
(Birnbaum et al., 1992; Goldstein & Einhom, 1987, Exper- 
iment 3 [who refer to P. Slovic, personal communication, 
1984]). These preference r versals are based on a violation 
2Bostic et al. (1990) found that a similar method provides results 
closer to preferences than does a direct matching method, inwhich 
participants hould immediately provide indifference values. 
Therefore, use of the bisection procedure critically tests our find- 
ings by maximally encouraging participants o act according to 
their preferences. If our matching responses are taken as genuine 
preferences, then our findings suggest violations of transitivity 
rather than of procedural invariance. 
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of monotonicity in choices between gambles. These prefer- 
ence reversals can also be interpreted as a violation of 
unidimensional procedure invariance. 
The phenomenon was further tested and confirmed by 
MeUers, Weiss, and Birnbaum (1992), Birnbaum and Sutton 
(1992), and Birnbaum (1992). Birnbaum et al. (1992) stud- 
ied configural weighting theory. A novel aspect of this 
theory is that 0 outcomes play a special role and can have 
decision weights different from those of other outcomes. If
a 0 outcome in a lottery is replaced by a positive outcome, 
then, as a consequence, the certainty equivalent (CE) (i.e., 
the certain amount of money that is equivalent) of the 
lottery can decrease. This idea was confirmed by experi- 
ments and was most pronounced for the lottery (96, .95; 24) 
(receiving $96 with probability .95, and $24 with probabil- 
ity .05) against he lottery (96, .95; 0). 
In a formal sense, it can be argued that the above- 
described finding implies a violation of unidimensional 
procedure invariance. As an explanation, suppose that we 
restrict attention to lotteries with a fixed probability, say .95, 
and suppress this probability. Then (X, Y) describes receipt 
of X with a probability of .95 and receipt of Y with a 
probability of .05. In the matching task, the typical finding 
is CE > CE', where CE and CE' are the certainty equiva- 
lents of (96, 0) and (96, 24), respectively. This finding, 
together with the obvious (96, 0) < (96, 24) in the choosing 
task, can be interpreted as a preference r versal that violates 
unidimensional procedure invariance. 
Although our preference reversal as well as the above- 
described preference reversal can both be interpreted as a 
violation of procedure invariance, the underlying psycho- 
logical processes are essentially different. Our finding is not 
based on neglect of a neutral outcome but rather on an entire 
sign reversal within a unidimensional scale. It is even more 
clear in the preference r versal of Birnbaum et al. (1992) 
than in ours that he irrational part is in the matching task of 
providing certainty equivalents. Again, in this quantitative 
task, participants resorted to mathematical heuristics and 
seemed to take some average of the outcomes in which, 
however, the 0 outcome was underweighted. Bimbaum et 
al.'s preference reversal was exhibited by up to 60% of 
participants. In a replication by von Winterfeldt, Chung, 
Luce, and Cho (1997), the percentage was somewhat lower; 
in several experiments it was about 35%. When the response 
mode did not involve direct quantitative judgment of cer- 
tainty equivalents but involved binary choices, von Winter- 
feldt et al. found that he number of preference r versals was 
reduced. They suggested that the remaining ones could be 
explained by inconsistencies in choices. Note that we used 
binary choices in the matching task but still found prefer- 
ence reversals. Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) confronted 
participants with their preference reversals; most partici- 
pants adjusted their actions so that the preference r versals 
disappeared. This finding is different from our finding, in 
which the preference r versals persisted for a large majority 
of participants when confronted with their inconsistencies. 
Thus, our preference r versals with poor health states may 
be more robust han the ones with gambles and neglect of 
the 0 outcome. 
Implications for Medical Decision Making 
The phenomenon described in this article was discovered 
in an empirical study of preference assessment methods for 
health states. Quality-adjusted life years are of considerable 
importance in the evaluation of health policies (see, e.g,, 
Viscusi & Evans, 1990). They are based on subjective 
values of health states and life durations. One of the most 
popular methods of preference assessment is the TTO 
method, introduced by Torrance et al. (1972). Suppose a 
person states that, for life duration Y in state of health Q, X 
years in perfect health (X < Y) is equivalent to (Y, Q). 
Then, the quotient of X/Y is usually taken as a measure, 
W(Q), of the utility of health state Q, and (Y, Q) is valued 
by a general multiplicative form, Y x W(Q). The multipli- 
cation by W(Q) constitutes the quality adjustment ofthe life 
duration Y. Sometimes an adjusted TTO method is used; in 
this method, the utility of Q is taken as V(X)/V(Y) for a 
nonlinear function V that may, for instance, reflect time 
discounting, and (Y, Q) is measured by V(Y) × W(Q). 
These measurements are based on classical rational models 
for participants' answers to I"1"O questions. Our findings 
provide evidence against these classical models. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the answers Of the 52 participants 
with preference reversals agreed well with a proportional 
evaluation in which, for a TTO question for (Y, Q), a 
participant chooses X as a proportion of Y, with the pro- 
portion W(Q) depending on Q. In the presence of response 
noise, for each fixed health state Q the answers X to TTO 
questions for (Y, Q) will be randomly distributed around a 
value, Y × W(Q), for W(Q) > 0. This proportional evalu- 
ation is supported by an ordinal analysis of the proportion 
X/Y. In Experiments la and lb, 17 of 37 women assigned 
a lower proportion to the (50, M) outcome than to the (25, 
M) outcome, 5 women assigned equal proportions, and the 
remaining 15 assigned higher proportions. In Experiment 2,
6 participants assigned a lower proportion to the (20, 4.5 
Migr) outcome than to the (10, 4.5 Migr) outcome, 3 par- 
ticipants assigned equal proportions, and the remaining 6
participants assigned higher proportions. These findings 
agree well with a proportional evaluation i which, because 
of random fluctuations in responses, a 50/50 split for the 
relative magnitude of the observed proportions i expected. 
The proportional heuristic is also supported by the analysis 
of the X/Y ratios. For the longer durations, we usually found 
a constant proportional trade-off. This finding is what one 
would expect for constant health states that are evaluated 
with a proportional heuristic. Note that a plot of X versus Y 
(not shown) results in a line pattern that fans out, indicating 
a multiplicative evaluation scheme (Anderson, 1976; 
Mellers, Ord6fiez, & Bimbaum, 1992). In a number of 
studies, a constant proportional trade-off or various life 
durations in the inferior health state was accepted (Hall, 
Gerard, Salkeld, & Richardson, 1992; Pliskin, Shepard, & 
Weinstein, 1980; Verhoef, 1994). Significant but small de- 
viations were found by Stalpers (1991), and stronger devi- 
ations were found by Sackett and Torrance (1978). Miy- 
amoto and Eraker (1988) and McNeil, Weichselbaum, and 
Pauker (1981) found deviations for short life durations (5 
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years or less) in which participants did not want to give up 
any life duration in return for health improvement. We 
found lower X/Y ratios for the short-term duration of 5 
years; our participants frequently commented that they were 
not willing to endure an illness for short durations. 
The proportional evaluation hypothesis suggests that the 
ratio X/Y, used in the classical TTO approach, provides 
more reliable information about he participant than a "cor- 
rected" value V(X)/V(Y), because X/Y reflects the propor- 
tion chosen by the participant. Validity is a problem, how- 
ever: In our experiments, the observed positive proportions 
clearly did not provide good measures for poor health states 
because the proportions of, for example, (10, 4.5 Migr) and 
(20, 4.5 Migr) were the same, whereas our participants 
preferred (10, 4.5 Migr). We conclude that for poor health 
states, the present usage of the TTO method is not 
appropriate. 
Our preference r versals could be interpreted in terms of 
changes of scales or changes of processes to combine the 
scales (Bimbaum et al., 1992; Mellers, Ord6fiez, & Birn- 
baum, 1992). To complete these theories, one needs to 
specify the scales and processes involved in both tasks. 
Because there is little structure in the present choice data, 
there is much freedom to speculate about whether scales or 
processes changed. Given the relatively clear violation of 
preference consistency, some explanation is needed, and 
given the current data, there are several possibilities that 
could be tested in future work. 
Conclusion 
This article has presented preference r versals of a more 
extreme nature than traditional preference reversals, be- 
cause in our experiments unidimensional procedure invari- 
ance was systematically violated by the majority of partic- 
ipants. Therefore, they cannot be explained by models that 
leave the unidimensional scales intact, such as weighted 
additive models, and they require a more substantial mod- 
ification of the classical preference model. Our data suggest 
that participants develop some rule of thumb for answering 
questions in an experirnent and that the relationship between 
that rule of thumb and some hypothesized underlying pref- 
erence system may be more remote and problematic than 
has been previously thought. 
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